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We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not
make any assumption regarding voters’ knowledge about each other. In dominant
strategy voting rules, voters’ behavior can be predicted uniquely without making
any such assumption. However, on full domains, the only dominant strategy vot-
ing rules are random dictatorships. We show that the designer of a voting rule
can achieve Pareto improvements over random dictatorship by choosing rules in
which voters’ behavior can depend on their beliefs. The Pareto improvement is
achieved for all possible beliefs. The mechanism that we use to demonstrate this
result is simple and intuitive, and the Pareto improvement result extends to all
equilibria of the mechanism that satisfy a mild refinement. We also show that
the result only holds for voters’ interim expected utilities, not for their ex post
expected utilities.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider the design of voting rules from the perspective of the theory of
robust mechanism design. Our starting point is the classic result due to Gibbard (1973)
and Satterthwaite (1975) according to which the only dominant strategy voting rules for
three or more alternatives are dictatorial voting rules. Gibbard and Satterthwaite as-
sumed the number of alternatives to be finite. Preferences were modeled as complete
and transitive orders of the set of alternatives. For every voter, the range of relevant pref-
erences was taken to be the set of all possible preferences over the alternatives. Gibbard
and Satterthwaite then asked whether it is possible to construct a game form1 that deter-
mines which alternative is selected as a function of the strategies chosen by the voters,
such that each voter has a dominant strategy regardless of what that voter’s preferences
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are. A dominant strategy was defined to be a strategy that is a best reply to each of the
other voters’ strategy combinations. Gibbard and Satterthwaite also required that every
alternative be the outcome under at least one strategy profile. They then showed that
the only game forms that satisfy this requirement, and that offer each voter, for every
preference of that voter, a dominant strategy are game forms that leave the choice of the
outcome to just one individual, the dictator.2
One motivation for the interest in dominant strategy mechanisms is that dominant
strategies predict rational voters’ behavior without relying on any assumption about the
voters’ beliefs about each others’ preferences or behavior. If a voter does not have a
dominant strategy, then that voter’s optimal choice depends on his beliefs about other
voters’ behavior, which in turn may be derived from beliefs about other voters’ prefer-
ences. It seems at first sight attractive to bypass such beliefs and to construct a game
form for which a prediction can be made that is independent of beliefs.
On closer inspection, this argument can be seen to consist of two parts:
A. The design of a good game form for voting should not be based on specific assump-
tions about voters’ beliefs about each other.
B. A good game form for voting should allow us to predict rational voters’ choices
uniquely from their preferences, without making specific assumptions about these
voters’ beliefs about each other.3
Both parts of the argument have their own appeal. Voting schemes are often con-
structed long before the particular contexts in which they will be used are known. It
seems wise not to make any special assumptions about agents’ knowledge about each
other, motivating part A of the argument. Part B can perhaps be motivated by the idea
that game forms in which voters’ behavior can be uniquely predicted independently of
their beliefs confront voters with simpler strategic problems than game forms in which
voters’ rational behavior is belief-dependent.
As the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem shows, A and B together impose strong re-
strictions on a voting scheme. In this paper we maintain A, but drop B. In other words,
we examine game forms for voting without making assumptions about voters’ beliefs
about each other, but we do not restrict attention to game forms for which voters’ equi-
librium strategies are independent of those beliefs. Our work is thus in a sense com-
plementary to the work surveyed by Barberà (2010) that insists on dominant strategies,
requirement B, but seeks to obtain more positive results than Gibbard and Satterthwaite
by restricting the domain of preferences that is considered.
To be able to use the notion of Bayesian equilibrium in our formal analysis, we
need to introduce a framework that is slightly different from Gibbard and Satterthwaite’s
2The literature that builds on Gibbard and Satterthwaite’s seminal work is voluminous. For a recent
survey, see Barberà (2010).
3Blin and Satterthwaite (1977) emphasize the interpretation of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem as a
result about voting procedures in which each voter’s choice depends only on his/her preferences and not
on his/her beliefs about others’ preferences.
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framework. We model voters’ attitudes toward risk, assuming that they maximize ex-
pected utility. A version of Gibbard and Satterthwaite’s theorem for expected utility max-
imizers was shown by Hylland (1980), who assumed that voters have von Neumann–
Morgenstern utilities and that lotteries are allowed as outcomes. He characterized game
forms that offer each agent a dominant strategy for every utility function, that pick an
alternative with probability 1 if it is unanimously preferred by all agents, and that pick
an alternative with probability 0 if it is unanimously ranked lowest by all agents. He
showed that, when there are at least three alternatives, the only such game forms are
random dictatorships.4 In random dictatorships, each voter i gets to be dictator with
a probability pi that is independent of all preferences. If voter i is dictator, then the
outcome that voter i ranks highest is chosen.
The two main results of this paper address whether there are game forms such that,
for all type spaces, there is at least one Bayesian equilibrium of the game form that
yields all voters’ types the same expected utility and, for some voters’ types in some type
spaces, strictly higher expected utility than random dictatorship. Obviously, the answer
to this question can be positive only when each voter’s probability of being dictator is
strictly less than 1. In our first main result, we show that in this case the answer to our
question is indeed positive, provided that we consider interim expected utility, that is,
each voter’s expected utility is calculated when that voter’s type is known, but the other
voters’ types are not yet known.5 If an ex post perspective is adopted instead, that is, if
voters’ expected utility is considered conditional on the vector of all voters’ types, then
no voting game form Pareto improves on random dictatorship. This is our second main
result.
We show the first main result using a simple game form that allows voters to avoid
random dictatorship and implement a compromise whenever all voters agree that the
compromise is preferable to random dictatorship. It will be easy to see that our first
main result can be extended and that we can show that not just one, but all Bayesian
equilibria of the game form that we are proposing, if they satisfy a mild refinement, yield
for all voters at least as high expected utility as random dictatorship.6
The compromise option may not turn out to be a Pareto improvement ex post, as
agents may compromise because they think it likely that the compromise will improve
on random dictatorship, but ex post discover to have a type vector that appeared un-
likely, and for which the compromise is not a Pareto improvement. The second main
result shows that any game form other than random dictatorship will sometimes make
some type worse off in comparison to random dictatorship.
4This result is Theorem 1* in Hylland (1980). It is also Theorem 1 in Dutta et al. (2007) (see also Dutta
et al. 2008), where an alternative proof is provided. Another proof is given in Nandeibam (2013).
5The notions of interim and ex post efficiency are due to Holmström and Myerson (1983).
6Our first, positive result is thus in the spirit of the literature on full implementation, which considers all
equilibria of a game form, whereas our second, negative result is in the spirit of the literature on mechanism
design, which considers only some equilibrium of a given game form. Both results are stronger than they
would be if the respective other approach were used. For the distinction between implementation and
mechanism design, see, for example, Jackson (2001).
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Important limitations of our work are that we only consider finite type spaces and
that we require Bayesian equilibria to be consistent. We define “consistency” in this pa-
per to mean that equilibrium actions, although they may depend on agents’ beliefs, do
not depend on the details of the formal representation of those beliefs. That we only
consider finite type spaces makes the first, positive result weaker, but it makes the sec-
ond, negative result stronger than it would be otherwise. The use of an equilibrium
refinement makes the first result stronger, but it makes the second result weaker than it
would be if we allowed all Bayesian equilibria.
We do not know whether our first, positive result would remain true if we considered
large type spaces such as the universal type space constructed by Mertens and Zamir
(1985) or a similar universal type space instead of the set of all finite type spaces. Our
second, negative result would not remain true if we allowed all Bayesian equilibria. Our
consistency requirement is a very weak requirement, however, and we believe it to be
persuasive. We discuss the details of the points that we have just touched on later in the
paper.
Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 explains the model and the defini-
tions used in this paper. In Section 4, we adapt Hylland’s theorem on random dictator-
ship to our setting. In Section 5, we explain how we relax the requirement that voters’
choices, for given preferences, are the same in all type spaces. Sections 6 and 7 contain
our two main results. Section 8 concludes.
2. Related literature
Our approach builds on Bergemann and Morris’ (2005) seminal work on robust mech-
anism design.7 They consider, as we do, Bayesian equilibria of mechanisms on all type
spaces. Unlike us, they do not rule out infinite type spaces and they do not require equi-
libria to be consistent. Bergemann and Morris study sufficient conditions under which
the Bayesian implementability of a social choice correspondence on all type spaces im-
plies dominant strategy implementability (or, more generally, implementability in ex
post equilibria). The main sufficient condition that they find is that the economic en-
vironment is separable. The two prime examples of separable environments are envi-
ronments in which the social choice correspondence is singleton valued, and environ-
ments in which each agent’s utility depends quasilinearly on a common component of
the outcome and the individual agent’s monetary transfer.
When strategies in a Bayesian equilibrium are belief-independent in the sense of
requirement B in the Introduction and all type spaces are considered, then the imple-
mented social choice correspondence is obviously singleton valued. Moreover, imple-
mentation of a singleton social choice correspondence on all type spaces implies that
truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy, not only if infinite type spaces
are included, as in Bergemann and Morris, but also if only finite type spaces are consid-
ered and also if attention is restricted to consistent Bayesian equilibria. We show this
7The literature on robust mechanism design and implementation was recently surveyed by Bergemann
and Morris (2012).
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simple observation in the proof of the preliminary result, Proposition 1 below, and use it
in that proof to apply Hylland’s theorem to social choice correspondences implemented
in belief-independent Bayesian equilibria for all finite type spaces.
Bergemann and Morris (2005, Section 6.3) point out that in nonseparable environ-
ments, such as the environment without transferrable payoffs that we consider, dom-
inant strategy implementability may be a stronger requirement than Bayesian imple-
mentability on all type spaces.8 Our paper shows that this observation remains true
when only consistent Bayesian equilibria are allowed and only finite type spaces are
considered.
Unlike our paper, Bergemann and Morris’ work, by restricting attention to social
choice correspondences, considers only ex post, but not interim, normative criteria.
Moreover, Bergemann and Morris do not consider how a mechanism designer com-
pares different mechanisms if none of them implements the social choice correspon-
dence that describes the designer’s most preferred outcomes. Such comparisons are the
focus of our work.
The approach to comparing different mechanisms that we take in this paper is based
on Smith (2010), who studies the design of a mechanism for public goods. Smith con-
siders the performance of different mechanisms in a Bayesian equilibrium on all type
spaces. He focuses on an ex post perspective and demonstrates that a mechanism de-
signer can improve efficiency using a more flexible mechanism than a dominant strat-
egy mechanism. In our setting, by contrast, we find that no mechanism can improve
on dominant strategy mechanisms ex post, but that such an improvement is possible
from an interim perspective. Smith finds improvement possibilities for any dominant
strategy mechanism, whereas in our setting improvements are only possible for those
dominant strategy mechanisms where the probability that any specific agent’s action
solely determines the outcome is less than 1.
Chung and Ely (2007) describe an auctioneer of a single object who designs an auc-
tion to maximize expected revenues. The auctioneer considers equilibria of different
auction mechanisms on the universal type space and evaluates different mechanisms
using a maximin criterion: taking the distribution of the agents’ valuations, but not the
agents’ beliefs, as given, for each mechanism, the auctioneer determines the probability
distribution on the universal type space for which that mechanism yields the lowest ex-
pected revenue. The auctioneer then chooses a mechanism that maximizes the lowest
expected revenue. Aside from the obvious differences in setting, the main conceptual
difference from our work is that our mechanism designer has only a partial order of
mechanisms, whereas Chung and Ely’s mechanism designer has a complete order. Our
order is based on comparing mechanisms on every type space, and ranking one mech-
anism above another if it performs according to the designer’s objectives at least as well
on all type spaces and better on some. For this order, we find, unlike Chung and Ely,
that in our setting there are mechanisms that perform better than dominant strategy
mechanisms.
8The discussion paper version (Bergemann and Morris 2003) of Bergemann and Morris (2005) also in-
cludes a general characterization of Bayesian implementability on all type spaces; however, we do not make
use of this characterization.
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Whereas the papers cited so far are concerned with mechanism design, in the sense
that for any given mechanism and type space only one Bayesian equilibrium is consid-
ered, there is also a literature on robust implementation, in which, for any given mech-
anism and type space, all Bayesian equilibria are taken into account. Bergemann and
Morris (2011) provide conditions for a social choice function to be implementable on
every type space.
A recent paper by Yamashita (2012) is related to the idea of robust implementation.
Yamashita considers a bilateral trade setting and evaluates mechanisms on the basis of
the lowest expected welfare among all outcomes that can result if agents use strategies
that are not weakly dominated. Expected welfare is calculated on the basis of the mech-
anism designer’s subjective prior over agents’ types. Yamashita’s work is similar to work
on implementation because he considers all outcomes, not just some outcomes, that
can result under a solution concept. A predecessor to Yamashita (2012) is Börgers (1991),
who considers, in the Gibbard–Satterthwaite framework, the existence of mechanisms
for which the outcomes that result if all players choose a strategy that is not weakly dom-
inated are Pareto efficient and (in a sense defined in that paper) less one-sided than the
outcomes of dictatorship. Börgers shows the existence of such mechanisms. Börgers
uses a framework in which agents’ preferences are modeled using ordinal preferences
rather than von Neumann Morgenstern utilities.9
In Börgers and Smith (2012), we further develop the approach of implementation in
non-weakly-dominated strategies. Among the applications that we consider are voting
mechanisms. We show the possibility of an ex post improvement over random dicta-
torship if one evaluates outcomes by taking the expected value of a Rawlsian welfare
function.
Bayesian mechanism design approaches to voting are surprisingly rare in the litera-
ture. For the case of independent types, Azrieli and Kim (forthcoming) recently consid-
ered interim and ex ante efficiency in a setting with two alternatives and independent
types. Schmitz and Tröger (2012) consider the same issue and allow correlated types.
Börgers and Postl (2009) study ex ante welfare maximization in a setting with three al-
ternatives. The type space in their paper is very small, with the ordinal ranking of alter-
natives being common knowledge and only the cardinal utility functions being private
information.
The game form that we use to prove our first main result—that random dictatorship
can be improved on from an interim perspective—is almost identical to the full consen-
sus or random ballot fall-back game form that Heitzig and Simmons (2012) introduced.
While their motivation, like ours, is to consider voting systems that are more flexible
than dictatorial voting systems and that allow for compromises, the focus of their for-
mal analysis is on complete information, correlated equilibria that are in some sense
coalition-proof. In our paper, the focus is on analyzing Bayesian equilibria in arbitrary
type spaces.
9Theorem III in Zeckhauser (1973) is a related but negative result for the case of von Neumann–
Morgenstern utilities.
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3. The voting problem
There are n agents: i ∈ I = {12     n}. The agents have to choose one alternative
from a finite set A of alternatives that has at least three elements. The set of all prob-
ability distributions over A is (A), where, for δ ∈ (A) and a ∈ A, we denote by
δ(a) ∈ [01] the probability that δ assigns to a. The agents are commonly known to
be expected utility maximizers. We denote agent i’s von Neumann–Morgenstern util-
ity function by ui :A → R. We assume that a = b ⇒ ui(a) = ui(b), that is, there are no
indifferences. We define the expected utility for probability distributions δ ∈ (A) by
ui(δ)=∑a∈A ui(a)δ(a).
A mechanism designer has a (possibly incomplete) ranking of the alternatives in A
that may depend on the agents’ utility functions. We shall be more specific about the de-
signer’s objectives later. The mechanism designer does not know the agents’ utility func-
tions; neither does she know what the agents believe about each other. To implement
an outcome that potentially depends on the agents’ utility functions, the mechanism
designer asks the agents to play a game form.
Definition 1. A game form G= (Sx) has two components:
(i) A set S ≡∏i∈I Si, where for every i ∈ I, the set Si is nonempty and finite.
(ii) A function x :S → (A).
The set Si is the set of (pure) strategies available to agent i in the game form G. We
focus on finite sets of pure strategies, while allowing mixed strategies, to ease exposition.
Our results also hold when the sets Si of pure strategies are allowed to be infinite. The
function x assigns to every combination of pure strategies s the potentially stochastic
outcome x(s) that is implemented when agents choose that combination of pure strate-
gies. We write x(sa) for the probability that x(s) assigns to alternative a.
Once the mechanism designer has announced a game form, the agents choose their
strategies simultaneously and independently. Because the agents do not necessarily
know each others’ utility functions or beliefs, this game may be a game of incomplete
information. A hypothesis about the agents’ utility functions and their beliefs about
each other can be described by a type space.10
Definition 2. A type space T = (Tπu) has the following components:
(i) A set T ≡∏i∈I Ti, where, for every i ∈ I, the set Ti is nonempty and finite.
(ii) An array π = (π1π2    πn) of functions πi :Ti → (T−i), where (T−i) is the set
of all probability distributions over T−i ≡∏j =i Tj .
(iii) An array u = (u1u2     un) of functions ui :Ti × A → R such that a = b ⇒
ui(ti a) = ui(ti b) for all ti ∈ Ti.
10The following definition only refers to finite type spaces. To simplify the terminology, we omit the
adjective “finite,” but we discuss the role that finiteness plays in our analysis after explaining the definition
and also later in the paper.
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The set Ti is the set of types of agent i. Agent i privately observes his type ti ∈ Ti.
The function πi describes, for every type ti ∈ Ti, the beliefs that agent i has about the
other agents’ types when agent i himself is of type ti. We write πi(ti t−i) for the prob-
ability that type ti assigns to the other players types being t−i. Beliefs are subjective.
There may or may not be a common prior for a particular type space. Different agents’
beliefs may be incompatible with each other in the sense that one agent may attach
positive probability to an event to which another agent attaches probability zero. The
function ui(ti) describes player i’s utility when i is of type ti. We write ui(ti a) for the util-
ity that ui(ti) assigns to alternative a. The utility functions ui(ti) satisfy the assumption
introduced earlier that there are no indifferences.11 We allow redundant types, that is,
multiple types with identical utility functions and identical hierarchies of beliefs over all
players’ utility functions. The possible importance of redundant types for the analysis
of Bayesian equilibria has been emphasized by Ely and Pe˛ski (2006, Section 1.2).
We assume that the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the agents’ utility
functions or their beliefs. Therefore, the mechanism designer regards all type spaces
as possible descriptions of the environment. We denote the set of all type spaces by ϒ.12
Alternatively, one may think of ϒ as just one large type space.
Note that we have assumed the sets Ti to be finite. Therefore, type spaces such as
the universal type space constructed by Mertens and Zamir (1985) or by Sadzik (2011)13
are not contained in ϒ; neither is ϒ in some sense equivalent to a universal type space.
To see the last point, note that every type in any type space in ϒ believes that it is com-
mon knowledge among agents that the cardinality of the support of all agents’ beliefs
at any level of their belief hierarchy is finite, whereas this is not the case for every type
in the universal type space. Our construction thus rules out some hierarchies of beliefs
that are allowed by either of the two universal type spaces mentioned above. We do not
know whether Proposition 2 below would remain true if we considered an appropriate
universal type space. We shall explain the difficulty in extending Proposition 2 to uni-
versal type spaces after the proof of Proposition 2. All other results in this paper would
remain unchanged if we considered either of the two universal type spaces mentioned
above.
The mechanism designer proposes to agents how they might play the game. For
the agents to accept the mechanism designer’s proposal, she must propose a Bayesian
equilibrium. Because the mechanism designer does not know the true type space, she
has to propose a Bayesian equilibrium for every type space.
Definition 3. A Bayesian equilibrium of game form G for every type space is an array
σ∗ = (σ∗1 σ∗2     σ∗n) such that for every i ∈ I,
(i) σ∗i is a family of functions (σ
∗
i (T ))T ∈ϒ, where for every T ∈ ϒ, the function σ∗i (T )
maps the type space Ti that corresponds to T into (Si), the set of all probability
distributions on Si,
11Observe that we suppress in the notation the dependence of πi and ui on the type space T . No confu-
sion should arise from this simplification of our notation.
12More precisely, ϒ is the set of all finite type spaces.
13Sadzik (2011) constructs a universal type space that is appropriate for the study of Bayesian Nash equi-
libria if one wants to allow redundant types.
Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) Mechanism design and voting rules 347
and, writing σ∗i (T  ti) for the mixed strategy assigned to ti and writing σ∗i (T  ti si) for the
probability that this mixed strategy assigns to si ∈ Si, we have for every T ∈ ϒ, i ∈ I, and
ti ∈ Ti (where Ti corresponds to T ),
(ii) σ∗i (T  ti) maximizes the expected utility of type ti among all mixed strategies in
(Si), where expected utility for any mixed strategy σi ∈ (Si) is∑
t−i∈T−i
πi(ti t−i)
∑
s∈S
ui(ti x(s)) · σi(si) ·
∏
j =i
σ∗j (T  tj sj)
The mechanism designer evaluates different mechanisms and their equilibria using
the Pareto criterion. When evaluating the agents’ utility for a realized type combination
t, the mechanism designer might only consider the outcomes that result from the mixed
strategies prescribed for these types. Alternatively, the mechanism designer might con-
sider the expected utilities of these types, based on the types’ own subjective beliefs. In
other words, the mechanism designer may adopt an ex post or an interim perspective
when evaluating agents’ utilities. The interim perspective respects agents’ own percep-
tion of their environment. The ex post perspective has a paternalistic flavor. On the
other hand, for example, when agents’ beliefs are incompatible with each other, the
mechanism designer may be justified in discarding agents’ beliefs on the basis that at
least some of them have to be wrong, as agents themselves will discover at some point.
Thus neither the interim nor the ex post perspective seems clearly preferable. We pursue
both perspectives in this paper.
Definition 4. The game form G and the Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces σ∗ in-
terimPareto dominate the game form G˜ and the Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces
σ˜∗ if for all T ∈ϒ, i ∈ I, and ti ∈ Ti,∑
t−i∈T−i
πi(ti t−i)
∑
s∈S
ui(ti x(s)) ·
∏
j∈I
σ∗j (T  tj sj)
≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
πi(ti t−i)
∑
s∈S˜
ui(ti x˜(s)) ·
∏
j∈I
σ˜∗j (T  tj sj)
with strict inequality for at least one T ∈ϒ, i ∈ I, and ti ∈ Ti.
Definition 5. The game form G and the Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces σ∗ ex
post Pareto dominate the game form G˜ and the Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces
σ˜∗ if for all T ∈ϒ, i ∈ I, and t ∈ T ,
∑
s∈S
ui(ti x(s)) ·
∏
j∈I
σ∗j (T  tj sj)≥
∑
s∈S˜
ui(ti x˜(s)) ·
∏
j∈I
σ˜∗j (T  tj sj)
with strict inequality for at least one T ∈ϒ, i ∈ I, and t ∈ T .
Our main interest in this paper is to explore how the mechanism designer’s abil-
ity to achieve her objective depends on additional conditions that Bayesian equilibria
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of the mechanism designer’s proposed game form have to satisfy. In the next section,
we consider the very restrictive requirement of belief independence. In the subsequent
sections, we relax this requirement.
4. Belief-independent equilibria: Hylland’s theorem
We begin by exploring the consequences of a restrictive requirement for the Bayesian
equilibrium that the mechanism designer proposes. This requirement is implicit in
the work on dominant strategy mechanism design. It is that equilibria be belief-
independent. Using the notion of belief-independent equilibria, we can restate Hylland’s
version of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem in our setting.
Definition 6. A Bayesian equilibrium for every type space, σ∗, of a game form G is
belief-independent if for all i ∈ I, T  T˜ ∈ ϒ, ti ∈ Ti, and t˜i ∈ T˜i such that ui(ti)= u˜i(t˜i), we
have
σ∗i (T  ti)= σ∗i (T˜  t˜i)
where Tiui correspond to T and T˜i u˜i correspond to T˜ .
The reformulation of Hylland’s theorem presented below says that all game forms
and belief-independent equilibria of these game forms that satisfy two unanimity re-
quirements are random dictatorships. To define the two unanimity requirements and
random dictatorship, we need some notation. If u is a utility function, we denote by
b(u) the element of A that maximizes u and denote by w(u) the element of A that min-
imizes u.14
Definition 7. A game form G and a Bayesian equilibrium of G for every type space,
σ∗, satisfy:
(i) Positive unanimity if for every T ∈ ϒ, t ∈ T , and a ∈ A such that b(ui(ti)) = a for
all i ∈ I, we have
∑
s∈S
∏
i∈I
σ∗i (T  ti si) · x(sa)= 1
(ii) Negative unanimity if for every T ∈ ϒ, t ∈ T , and a ∈ A such that w(ui(ti)) = a for
all i ∈ I, we have
∑
s∈S
∏
i∈I
σ∗i (T  ti si) · x(sa)= 0
Positive and negative unanimity are implied by, but weaker than, ex post Pareto effi-
ciency. Next, we provide the formal definition of random dictatorship that we need for
our reformulation of Hylland’s theorem.
14Recall that we have assumed that there are no indifferences. Therefore, there is a unique element of A
that maximizes u and a unique element of A that minimizes u.
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Definition 8. A game form G and a Bayesian equilibrium of G for every type space,
σ∗, are a random dictatorship if there is some p ∈ [01]n such that for every T ∈ϒ, t ∈ T ,
and a ∈A, ∑
s∈S
∏
i∈I
σ∗i (T  ti si) · x(sa)=
∑
{i∈I:b(ui(ti))=a}
pi
The following proposition is implied by Hylland’s theorem.15
Proposition 1. A game form G and a belief-independent Bayesian equilibrium of G
for every type space, σ∗, satisfy positive and negative unanimity if and only if they are a
random dictatorship.
Proof. The “if” part is obvious. To prove the “only if” part, we derive from G and σ∗ a
“cardinal decision scheme” in the sense of Definition 1 in Dutta et al. (2007) and show
that this cardinal decision scheme has the properties listed in Theorem 1 in Dutta et al.
(2007) and the correction in Dutta et al. (2008). It then follows from Theorem 1 in Dutta
et al. (2007) that the cardinal decision scheme is a random dictatorship. This then im-
plies the “only if” part of our Proposition 1.
Denote by U the set of all utility functions that have the property of no indifferences
(see Definition 2). A cardinal decision scheme is a mapping φ :Un → (A). We can
derive from G and σ∗ a cardinal decision scheme by setting, for any (u1u2     un) ∈ Un
and a ∈A, the probability φ(u1u2     una) that φ(u1u2     un) assigns to a as
φ(u1u2     una)=
∑
s∈S
∏
i∈I
σ∗i (T  ti si) · x(sa)
where we can pick any T ∈ϒ and any t ∈ T such that ui(ti)= ui for all i ∈ I. By belief in-
dependence, it does not matter which such T and t ∈ T we choose. Then φ is a cardinal
decision scheme as defined in Definition 1 of Dutta et al. (2007).
We can complete the proof by showing that φ has the two properties listed in
Theorem 1 of Dutta et al. (2007) and the additional property listed in the correction
(Dutta et al. 2008). The first property is unanimity: If b(ui) = a for all i ∈ I, then
φ(u1u2     una)= 1. This is implied by the assumption that G and σ∗ satisfy positive
unanimity.
The second property is strategy proofness: If (u1u2     un) ∈ Un and u′i ∈ U , then
ui(φ(uiu−i)) ≥ ui(φ(u′i u−i)), where u−i is the array (u1u2     un) that leaves out ui.
To prove this, we pick T ∈ ϒ, ti t ′i ∈ Ti, and t−i ∈
∏
j =i Tj such that ui(ti)= ui, ui(t ′i)= u′i,
and uj(tj) = uj for all j = i. Moreover, πi(ti) and πi(t ′i) place probability 1 on t−i. Then
the fact that σ∗ is a Bayesian equilibrium of G for the type space T implies∑
s∈S
ui(ti x(s)) · σ∗i (T  ti si) ·
∏
j =i
σ∗j (T  tj sj)
≥
∑
s∈S
ui(ti x(s)) · σ∗i (T  t ′i si) ·
∏
j =i
σ∗j (T  tj sj)
15Theorem 1* in Hylland (1980). We use here the version of Hylland’s theorem that is Theorem 1 in Dutta
et al. (2007) with the correction in Dutta et al. (2008).
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By the definition of φ, this is equivalent to ui(φ(uiu−i)≥ ui(φ(u′i u−i)), that is, strategy
proofness.
The third property, introduced in the correction (Dutta et al. 2008), is a property
labelled (*) in Dutta et al. (2008): If w(ui) = a for all i ∈ I, then φ(u1u2     una) = 0.
This is implied by the assumption that G and σ∗ satisfy negative unanimity. 
From now on, when we refer to random dictatorship, we mean a specific game form
G and a specific equilibrium σ∗ of G for every type space.
Definition 9. For any vector p ∈ [01]n such that ∑i∈I pi = 1, the following game
form G and equilibrium σ∗ of G for every type space will be referred to as p-random
dictatorship:
(i) Si =A for all i ∈ I
(ii) x(sa)=∑{i∈I:si=a}pi for all s ∈ S and a ∈A
(iii) σ∗i (T  ti b(ui(ti)))= 1 for all i ∈ I, T ∈ϒ, and ti ∈ Ti.
It is immediate that σ∗ is a belief-independent Bayesian equilibrium of G for every type
space, and that G and this equilibrium are a random dictatorship. There are other game
forms and equilibria that are random dictatorships, but it is without loss of generality to
only consider the ones described in Definition 9.
5. Consistent equilibria
Our main interest in this paper is to consider the implications of relaxing the require-
ment of belief independence for the Bayesian equilibria of the game form that the mech-
anism designer chooses. We do not, however, completely dispense with any link be-
tween players’ strategies in different type spaces. The Bayesian equilibria that we shall
investigate need to satisfy a consistency requirement. This requirement is implied by,
but does not imply, belief independence.
Definition 10. A Bayesian equilibrium of game form G for every type space, σ∗, is
consistent if for all type spaces T  T˜ ∈ϒ, if the following statements hold:
(i) for every i ∈ I, Ti ⊆ T˜i (where Ti corresponds to T and T˜i corresponds to T˜ ),
(ii) for every i ∈ I and every ti ∈ Ti, u˜i(ti) = ui(ti) and π˜i(ti) = πi(ti) (where uiπi cor-
respond to T and u˜i π˜i correspond to T˜ ),
then
(iii) we have for every i ∈ I and every ti ∈ Ti, σ∗i (T˜  ti)= σ∗i (T  ti).
While Proposition 2 below remains true even if one considers all Bayesian equilibria,
not just consistent equilibria, Proposition 3 does not. Proposition 3 does remain true,
however, if we include a universal type space among the type spaces that we consider.
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We discuss these points in Section 7. In any case, we regard the consistency refinement
as eminently plausible. Observe that the type ti referred to in item (iii) of Definition 10
has the same utility function and hierarchy of beliefs over other players’ utility functions
and types in type space T˜ as in type space T . In technical language, type space T is a
“belief-closed subspace” of type space T˜ . Enlarging the type space from T to T˜ does
not reflect any change in the beliefs of types in type space T , but instead reflects that
the modeler or the mechanism designer considers more specifications of agents’ beliefs
than were included in type space T . Therefore, agents’ strategy choices for types in T
should not change when the type space is enlarged from T to T˜ . This is the content of
the consistency refinement.
If one interprets a player’s type in a type space as a convenient representation of
that player’s hierarchy of beliefs, then consistency is a very cautious formalization of
the requirement that the particular representation of this hierarchy of beliefs should not
matter as long as the hierarchy itself is unchanged. This requirement is an example of
the invariance requirements studied in Yildiz (2011). These invariance requirements
place the restriction on the selection of equilibria of the same game for different type
spaces that types with identical information play the same equilibrium action. As Yildiz
emphasizes, there are different reasonable interpretations of the phrase “identical in-
formation” and corresponding different invariance requirements. In Definition 10, we
interpret identical information to mean identical hierarchies of beliefs about players’
utility function and types.16
Note that we allow equilibrium actions to depend on the labels of players’ types,
which makes consistency a particularly weak requirement. In particular, consistency
does not imply that equilibrium actions are the same for redundant types, that is, equi-
librium actions need not only depend on a player’s utility function and the player’s hi-
erarchy of beliefs about players’ utility functions, that is, the player’s hierarchy of beliefs
in Mertens and Zamir’s universal type space. However, when a Bayesian equilibrium of
a game on Mertens and Zamir’s universal type space exists, one can construct a corre-
sponding consistent equilibrium for all finite type spaces by appealing to the “equilib-
rium pull-back property” of Friedenberg and Meier (2010, Proposition 4.1).
6. A game form that interim Pareto dominates random dictatorship
The first main result of this paper examines interim Pareto dominance, while the second
main result concerns ex post Pareto dominance. The first result says that for every p ∈
[01]n such that∑i∈I pi = 1 and pi < 1 for all i ∈ I, there is a game form and a consistent
equilibrium of this game form for every type space that interim Pareto dominates p-
random dictatorship.17 We refer to the dominating game form as p-randomdictatorship
with compromise.
16One checks easily that our invariance notion has the property that Yildiz requires invariance notions
to have.
17If pi = 1 for some i ∈ I, that is, when dictatorship is deterministic, not random, then obviously no game
form can interim Pareto dominate dictatorship.
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Definition 11. For every p ∈ [01]n such that∑i∈I pi = 1, the following game form is
called a p-random dictatorship with compromise.
(i) For every i ∈ I,
Si =A×R
where A is the set of all nonempty subsets of A and R is the set of all complete
strict ordinal rankings of A. We write si = (AiRi) ∈ Si for a strategy for agent i.
(ii) If
⋂
i∈I Ai =∅, then for all a ∈A,
x(sa)=
∑
{i∈I:aRia′ ∀a′∈A}
pi
(iii) If
⋂
i∈I Ai =∅, then for all a ∈
⋂
i∈I Ai,
x(sa)=
∑
{i∈I:aRia′ ∀a′∈
⋂
i∈I Ai}
pi
In words, this game form offers each agent i the opportunity to provide a complete
ranking of outcomes Ri and also a set Ai of “acceptable” alternatives. If there is at least
one common element among the sets of acceptable alternatives for all agents, then the
mechanism implements random dictatorship (with the preferences described by the
Ri), but with the restriction that the dictator can only choose an outcome from the unan-
imously acceptable alternatives. Otherwise, the mechanism reverts to random dictator-
ship (with outcomes determined by the highest ranked elements of the Ri). We refer to
this game form as p-random dictatorship with compromise because it offers agents the
opportunity to replace the outcome of p-random dictatorship with a compromise on a
mutually acceptable alternative.18
It is elementary to verify that a strategy of player i, such that for some type ti, we
have b(ui(ti)) /∈ Ai, is weakly dominated by the same strategy in which Ai is replaced
by Ai ∪ {b(ui(ti))}. Moreover, any strategy of some player i, such that for some type ti,
we have that Ri is not type ti’s true preference over Ai as described by ui(ti), is weakly
dominated by a strategy such thatAi is left unchanged, butRi is replaced by a preference
ordering that reflects ti’s true preference over Ai. Preferences that player i indicates for
alternatives A \ Ai are irrelevant for the outcome of the game. These considerations
motivate us to restrict attention to “truthful strategies,” which we define to be strategies
such that b(ui(ti)) ∈Ai and such that Ri is the true preference according to ui(ti) for all
types ti. Note that we have ruled out some, but not necessarily all, weakly dominated
18This game form was inspired by approval voting (see Brams and Fishburn 2007), which, like our game
form, allows voters to indicate acceptable alternatives. However, in approval voting the alternative that
the largest number of agents regards as acceptable is selected, whereas our game form requires unanimity.
Moreover, our game form uses random dictatorship as a fall-back, whereas approval voting does not have
any such fall-back. When p is the uniform distribution, the game form that we consider is closely related
to the full consensus or random ballot fall-back game form that Heitzig and Simmons (2012) introduced.
Heitzig and Simmons require the sets Ai to be singletons.
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strategies. In any case, it seems eminently plausible that all players will choose truthful
strategies.
In a Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces in which all players choose truthful
strategies, any type’s interim expected utility is not smaller than the interim expected
utility from p-random dictatorship. This is because a type can always force an outcome
that gives at least as high interim expected utility as p-random dictatorship by choosing
the truthful strategy for which Ai = {b(ui(ti))}. Note also that it is a consistent Bayesian
equilibrium for all type spaces that all players choose this strategy for all types.
We now show thatp-randomdictatorshipwith compromise also has a Bayesian equi-
librium for all type spaces in which all players choose truthful strategies and that interim
Pareto dominates random dictatorship. We further show that this equilibrium respects
positive and negative unanimity. The latter observation clarifies that our result is indeed
a consequence of weakening the belief independence requirement and not of weaken-
ing any other property listed in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. For every p ∈ [01]n such that ∑i∈I pi = 1 and pi < 1 for all i ∈ I, p-
random dictatorship with compromise has a consistent Bayesian equilibrium for all type
spaces σ∗ that interim Pareto dominates p-random dictatorship and that satisfies posi-
tive and negative unanimity.
Proof. We construct the equilibrium σ∗ inductively. We begin by considering type
spaces T , where for every i ∈ I, the set Ti has exactly one element. In such type spaces,
for every i ∈ I, it is common knowledge among the agents that agent i has utility func-
tion ui(ti). We distinguish two cases. The first is that there is some alternative a ∈A such
that for all i ∈ I, we have
ui(ti a) >
∑
j∈I
pjui(ti b(uj(tj))) (1)
Observe that the assumption pi < 1 for all i ∈ I implies that some such type spaces exist.
For such type spaces, the strategies are
σ∗i (T  ti)= ({b(ui(ti)) a}Ri) (2)
for all i ∈ I, where Ri is agent i’s true preference and where a is some alternative for
which (1) holds.19 These strategies obviously constitute a Nash equilibrium of the com-
plete information game in which agents’ preferences are common knowledge. Note that
the outcome a then results and that this outcome strictly Pareto-dominates the outcome
of random dictatorship.
For all other type spaces with just a single element for each player, the strategies are
σ∗i (T  ti)= ({b(ui(ti))}Ri)
for all i ∈ I, where Ri is again agent i’s true preference. We noted earlier that these strate-
gies constitute a Nash equilibrium and that the outcome is the same as under p-random
dictatorship.
19Note that a must be the same for all players.
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Now suppose we had constructed the equilibrium for all type spaces T in which the
sum over i of the numbers of elements of the sets Ti is at most k, that is,
∑
i∈I |Ti| ≤ k.
We extend the construction to all type spaces T in which this sum is k + 1. Fix some
particular such type space T . Consider all type spaces T˜ that are contained in T , that is,
for which conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 10 hold, and that are not equal to T . For
such type spaces, we define for every i ∈ I and every ti ∈ T˜i,
σ∗i (T  ti)= σ∗i (T˜  ti)
By the inductive hypothesis, the right hand side of this equation has already been de-
fined. Observe that the right hand side does not depend on the particular choice of T˜ . If
a type ti of player i is contained in player i’s type set in two different type spaces T˜ and T̂
that are contained in T in the sense of Definition 10, then the intersection of these type
spaces is also a type space and, by consistency, the same strategy is assigned to type ti in
T˜ and in T̂ .
If the previous step defines the equilibrium strategy for all types in T , then the in-
ductive step is completed. Otherwise, it remains to define strategies for types ti that are
not contained in any type set of a type space that is a subspace of T . We consider the
strategic game in which each such type is a separate player and expected utilities are cal-
culated, keeping the strategies of types that have already been dealt with in the previous
paragraph fixed, and using each type’s subjective beliefs to calculate that type’s expected
payoff. We restrict attention to truthful strategies and strategies such that w(ui(ti)) /∈Ai.
This strategic game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, and this Nash equilib-
rium is also a Nash equilibrium of the game with unrestricted strategy spaces. For each
type ti that still has to be dealt with, we define the strategy σ∗i (T  ti) to be type ti’s equi-
librium strategy.
By construction, these strategies satisfy the consistency requirement. Also, they are
by construction interim Bayesian equilibria: For types in type sets that correspond to a
smaller type space, the Bayesian equilibrium property carries over from the smaller type
space. For all other types, their choices maximize expected utility by construction.
The equilibrium that we have constructed interim Pareto dominates random dicta-
torship. First, we note that when all players choose truthful strategies, no type can have
lower expected utility than under random dictatorship. This is because each type can
guarantee themselves an outcome that is at least as good as the random dictatorship
outcome by choosing Ai = {b(ui(ti))}. Second, each type’s expected utility is increased
on type spaces in which each player’s type set has just a single element and for which
inequality (1) holds.
The equilibrium that we have constructed satisfies positive unanimity because all
players include their most preferred alternative in the set Ai. If all players have the same
most preferred alternative, the sets Ai will have a nonempty intersection and the ran-
dom dictator will select the alternative that is most preferred by everyone. The equilib-
rium also satisfies negative unanimity. We have assumed that no player includes his/her
least preferred alternative in the set Ai. Therefore, independent of whether these sets
have a nonempty intersection or not, the random dictator will not select the agents’
least preferred alternative if they all have the same least preferred alternative. 
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In the above proof, we could have replaced the second step of our induction by an
appeal to Propositions 2 and 3 in Yildiz (2011). This is because the second step extends
the equilibrium construction from a set of small type spaces to a set of larger type spaces,
making sure that the equilibrium for the larger type space is consistent, and Yildiz’s re-
sults show the possibility of such an extension for a class of invariance requirements that
includes consistency, using a more general version of the argument that we have used
above. To make this paper self-contained, we have given a complete proof of Proposi-
tion 2.
It is obvious that the proof of Proposition 2 also proves the following result.
Remark 1. If pi < 1 for all i ∈ I, then every Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces of
p-random dictatorship with compromise, in which all players choose truthful strate-
gies, and in which players choose strategies of the form (2) in type spaces in which each
player’s type set has just a single element and for which inequality (1) holds,20 interim
Pareto dominates p-random dictatorship.
Note that the set of truthful strategies includes, in particular, the set of all non-
weakly-dominated strategies. Therefore, Remark 1 applies to all equilibria in non-
weakly-dominated strategies. As we explained in the Introduction, the importance of
this result is that it shows that p-random dictatorship with compromise interim Pareto
dominates p-random dictatorship not just in the sense of mechanism design (where
we only have to find one equilibrium with the desired properties), but also in the
sense of implementation (where all equilibria—or, as in our case, all that satisfy some
refinement—are considered). Observe, incidentally, that for the result of Remark 1, the
Bayesian equilibrium for all type spaces does not need to be consistent.
We do not know whether Proposition 2 remains true if we include a universal type
space, such as Mertens and Zamir (1985) or Sadzik (2011) universal type space, in the
set of type spaces that we consider or if we consider equilibria on the universal type
space alone. No Bayesian equilibrium on any type space in truthful strategies can make
any player worse off at the interim level than random dictatorship, because each agent
can always unilaterally enforce a return to random dictatorship. This step presents no
difficulty. Proving the existence of some consistent Bayesian equilibrium is not problem-
atic either. First, we can ignore the consistency requirement and all type spaces except
the universal type space, because (as we noted in Section 5) we can derive from any
Bayesian equilibrium on a universal type space a consistent Bayesian equilibrium for all
type spaces. Second, it is immediate that it is a Bayesian equilibrium of p-random dic-
tatorship with compromise on the universal type space that all agents choose as if there
were no possibility to compromise. The problem is that this equilibrium is equivalent to
p-random dictatorship. There is no type vector for which it is interim Pareto superior to
p-random dictatorship, as required by interim Pareto dominance.
20In words, this condition says that if utility functions are common knowledge and some alternative
Pareto dominates random dictatorship, then players pick their preferred alternative and some alternative—
the same for all players—that Pareto dominates random dictatorship as their set of acceptable alternatives.
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To see the difficulty in finding a suitable equilibrium on the universal type space,
consider what would happen if we tried to adapt the argument in the proof of Proposi-
tion 2 to a universal type space. We would again begin by considering subsets of the uni-
versal type space in which payoffs are common knowledge and we would define equilib-
rium for such subsets as in the proof of Proposition 2. We would then seek to extend the
equilibrium, defining strategies for all types in the universal type space. The difficulty is
that we do not know whether this extension is possible. When such an extension is pos-
sible for every Bayesian equilibrium, Friedenberg and Meier (2010) say that the original
game, the restricted type space, and the larger type space have the “equilibrium exten-
sion property.” Friedenberg and Meier give an example where the larger type space is
Mertens and Zamir’s universal type space and where the extension property fails to hold
for some equilibrium. They also provide sufficient conditions for the equilibrium exten-
sion property to be satisfied, but it is immediate that these conditions do not hold in our
example.
7. No game form ex post Pareto dominates random dictatorship
In this section we show that the result of the previous section does not hold if utilities are
evaluated ex post. The following proposition shows that in fact no mechanism ex post
Pareto dominates p-random dictatorship.
Proposition 3. For every p ∈ [01]n such that ∑i∈I pi = 1, there is no game form G
that has a consistent equilibrium for all type spaces σ∗ that ex post Pareto dominates
p-random dictatorship.
Proof. The proof is indirect. Suppose for some p ∈ [01]n such that∑i∈I pi = 1, there
were a game form G and a consistent Bayesian equilibrium of G for all type spaces σ∗
that ex post Pareto dominatedp-random dictatorship. For the outcome that results from
G and σ∗ to be different from p-random dictatorship, there must be some T̂ ∈ ϒ, tˆ ∈ T̂ ,
and aˆ ∈A such that
∑
s∈S
x(s aˆ) ·
∏
i∈I
σ∗i (T̂  tˆi si) <
∑
{i∈I:b(ui(tˆi))=aˆ}
pi (3)
That is, alternative aˆ is chosen with a probability that is strictly smaller than the prob-
ability with which it is chosen under random dictatorship. Let Î be the set {i ∈ I :
b(ui(tˆi)) = aˆ}. Notice that we must have ∅ = Î = I. If Î = ∅, the right hand side of (3)
would be zero. If Î = I, then G and σ∗ would be ex post Pareto worse than random dic-
tatorship at tˆ. To complete the proof, we construct a new type space T˜ and infer from (3)
that in this type space there is a type vector such that the types of all players in Î strictly
prefer the outcome of p-random dictatorship conditional on this type vector to the out-
come in G resulting from the equilibrium σ∗ conditional on this type vector. Therefore,
G and σ∗ do not ex post Pareto dominate p-random dictatorship.
The type sets in T˜ are given by T˜i = T̂i for all i ∈ Î and T˜i = T̂i ∪ {t˜i} for all i /∈ Î. For all
i ∈ I, the types in T̂i have the same utility functions and beliefs in T˜ as in T̂ . For all i /∈ Î,
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type t˜i’s beliefs are given by
πi(t˜i)[((tˆj)j∈Î  (t˜j) j /∈Î
j<i
 (tˆj) j /∈Î
j>i
)] = 1
and type t˜i’s utility function is
u˜i(t˜i a)=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if a= a˜
1− εa if a /∈ {aˆ a˜}
0 if a= aˆ
where a˜ denotes the second most preferred alternative of some player k’s type tˆk, where
k ∈ Î. We assume that 0< εa < ε¯ for all a /∈ {aˆ a˜} for some ε¯ ∈ (01), and that aa′ /∈ {aˆ a˜}
and a = a′ implies εa = εa′ . This assumption ensures that the utility functions satisfy the
condition of no indifferences. Moreover, by letting ε¯ tend to zero, we can ensure that all
εa tend to zero, which is the case that we shall focus on.
We now show that for ε¯ sufficiently small at type vector ((tˆi)i∈Î  (t˜i)i/∈Î ), the alterna-
tives other than aˆ are in equilibrium σ∗ chosen with a probability larger than 1−∑i∈Î pi.
Note that the proof of Proposition 3 is concluded once this assertion is established. This
is because random dictatorship gives for some k ∈ Î player k’s type tˆk, his/her top alter-
native aˆ with probability
∑
i∈Î pi and type tˆk’s second most preferred alternative a˜ with
probability 1 −∑i∈Î pi. By contrast, G and σ∗ yield aˆ with probability less than∑i∈Î pi
and some other alternative, not necessarily type tˆk’s second most preferred alternative,
with a probability larger than 1 −∑i∈Î pi. Therefore, type tˆk strictly prefers random
dictatorship.
Consider the player i /∈ Î for whom i is smallest. We denote this player by i1. This
player, when type t˜i1, expects with probability 1 that the other players’ type vector is
tˆ−i1. Because σ∗ is consistent, type t˜i1 expects the types tˆ−i1 to choose the same in T˜ as
in T̂ . By the assumption of the indirect proof, type tˆi1 has a strategy available that yields
alternatives other than aˆ with probability of more than 1−∑i∈Î pi. Type t˜i1 will not nec-
essarily choose the same strategy as type tˆi1. But, for small enough ε¯, only a strategy
that yields an alternative other than aˆ with some probability p˜ > 1 −∑i∈Î pi can be op-
timal. Choosing such a strategy yields for type t˜i1 expected payoff greater than p˜(1− ε¯),
whereas any other pure strategy yields a payoff that is no more than 1−∑i∈Î pi < p˜. For
small enough ε¯, the former expected payoff is larger than the latter.
Now consider the player i /∈ Î for whom i is second smallest. We denote this player
by i2. This player, when type t˜i2, expects with probability 1 the other players’ types to
be tˆ−i2 except for player i1, whom i2 expects with probability 1 to be type t˜i1. By the
step of the previous paragraph, if t˜i2 chose the same strategy as tˆi2 does in equilibrium,
t˜i2 would expect an outcome other than aˆ with probability larger than 1 −∑i∈Î pi. He
might choose in equilibrium some other strategy, but, for small enough ε¯, he will never
make a choice that yields an outcome other than aˆ with a probability that is not larger
than 1−∑i∈Î pi.
The step of the previous paragraph can be iterated until we arrive at the player i /∈ Î
for whom i is largest. We denote this player by i(m). This player expects the other players
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to be of type t˜−(i(m)) except for types i ∈ Î, whom this player expects to be of type tˆi. By
the same argument used in the previous two paragraphs, type t˜i(m) chooses in equilib-
rium a strategy that he expects to yield an outcome other than aˆ with probability larger
than 1 −∑i∈Î pi. But at type vector ((tˆi)i∈Î  (t˜i)i/∈Î ), this type has correct expectations
and, therefore, at this type vector, the equilibrium strategies do indeed yield an outcome
other than aˆ with probability larger than 1−∑i∈Î pi. As explained above, this concludes
the proof. 
If our solution concept were Bayesian equilibrium without refinement rather than
consistent equilibrium, Proposition 3 would be false. The p-random dictatorship with
compromise has the following Bayesian equilibrium that ex post Pareto dominates p-
random dictatorship. For the common knowledge type spaces referred to in the first
paragraph of the proof of Proposition 2, agents play the strategies described in that para-
graph. For all other type spaces, they ignore the possibility of compromise. We do not
find this equilibrium plausible. It implies that agents’ choices in the case that prefer-
ences are common knowledge depend on whether that common knowledge is repre-
sented by a single element type space or by a larger type space that includes as a belief-
closed subset the same single element type space. As we argued in Section 5, this means
that agents’ choices not only depend on agents’ beliefs, but also on the way in which the
modeler represents those beliefs, which, to us, does not seem to make sense.
Proposition 3 would remain true if we included a universal type space in the set of
all type spaces that we consider, and it would also remain true if the universal type space
were the only type space that we considered. Indeed, one could then drop the consis-
tency requirement and focus on the universal type space, even if other type spaces were
included in the model. The argument in the proof of Proposition 3 would go through
without alteration.
8. Conclusion
Gibbard and Satterthwaite’s impossibility theorem, and Hylland’s version of this theo-
rem in a setting with stochastic outcomes are central results of voting theory. We have ar-
gued that the insistence of these theorems on belief-independent strategy choices may
be overly restrictive if a mechanism designer is concerned with Pareto improvements.
Such a mechanism designer can find voting schemes that are superior to random dicta-
torship if agents’ choices are allowed to depend on their beliefs. Whatever those beliefs
are, the outcomes will be at least as good as under random dictatorship and sometimes
better. Such an improvement is only possible if agents’ subjective beliefs are accepted
and an interim perspective is adopted. From an ex post perspective, such unambiguous
improvements are not possible.
An important problem left open by our paper is the characterization of voting rules
that are not dominated in one of the senses considered here. One can take a mechanism
design or an implementation approach to this question, depending on whether one
considers just one or all consistent Bayesian equilibria on all type spaces of a given game
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form. In Smith (2010), the analogous question is investigated for public good mecha-
nisms, using a mechanism design approach. Smith proves for one particular mecha-
nism that it is not dominated. Smith’s work shows the subtleties involved in such proofs.
We leave the question as applied to voting rules for future research.
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